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Abstract
In this paper we first review the available literature on the degree of insurance
against shocks, provided by the central budget in the federal systems already existing.
Next, we discuss the main points raised on the debate about the implementation of an
automatic mechanism designed to cope with country-specific shocks in a monetary
union, and present a specific proposal of such a mechanism.
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11. Introduction
Allocation, redistribution, and stabilisation are considered as the traditional
functions of fiscal policy. Allocation (i. e., the provision of public goods) is usually
performed through government expenditures, but redistribution and stabilisation also
depend on the tax and transfer system. In its turn, redistribution is addressed to correct
structural disequilibria and reduce regional disparities, while the stabilisation function
has as its main objective to counteract the economyÕs fluctuations. However, depending
on the origin of fluctuations, we can distinguish between the stabilisation function in
itself and the insurance function of federal fiscal policy (Eichengreen, 1993). The
stabilisation function of fiscal policy would try to offset the effects of a shock affecting
to all the regions or countries belonging to a greater area (i. e., a common or symmetric
shock), while the insurance function would try to counteract a region or country-specific
shock (i. e., an asymmetric shock). In other words, the difference between stabilisation
and insurance would be related to the symmetry or asymmetry of the shocks.
The formation of a monetary union by 11 member countries of the European
Union (EU), following the adoption of a common currency, the Euro (leading to the so-
called Economic and Monetary Union, or EMU), has increased the concern for this
issue. In this way, a wide range of studies on the nature of the shocks that might
eventually affect to the member countries of EMU has appeared in last years; see,
among others, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Erkel-Rousse and Mlitz (1995), and
Driver and Wren-Lewis (1999). In general, all of them agree on the importance of fiscal
policy to offset country-specific shocks, but there is not concluding evidence on the
higher or lower probability of suffering country-specific shocks in a monetary union.
For that reason no consensus has emerged yet, either on the degree of stabilisation
versus insurance required, or on the way of implementing these fiscal policy functions.
In federal states, as well as in monetary unions, the central budget plays a key
role in the implementation of the redistribution and stabilisation functions of fiscal
policy. In particular, a federal fiscal system based on progressive taxes and transfers can
perform both functions simultaneously, since tax revenues (transfers) would be smaller
(higher) in those regions with lower incomes, leading to redistribution; and tax revenues
(transfers) would decrease (increase) as income falls, leading to stabilisation. Assuming
that tax revenues decrease and transfers increase following a recession, several
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central budget in the federal systems already existing; see, among others, Sala-i-Martin
and Sachs (1992), von Hagen (1992), Goodhart and Smith (1993), Pisani-Ferry,
Italianer and Lescure (1993), and Bayoumi and Masson (1995). Their results are not
very conclusive since they overlap redistribution and stabilisation, and they do not
properly distinguish stabilisation from the insurance function of fiscal policy.
Some of the studies quoted before relate the experience of the existing
federations with the management of fiscal policy in EMU, concluding that the size of
the EU budget is not big enough to provide stabilisation. Because of that, another
question broadly discussed has been the possibility of designing some kind of automatic
mechanism able to produce a similar degree of stabilisation to that provided by federal
budgets; see, among others, Majocchi and Rey (1993), Italianer and Vanheukelen
(1993), Mlitz and Vori (1993), and von Hagen and Hammond (1998).
As mentioned above, most studies on the role of fiscal policy in monetary unions
have discussed the degree of stabilisation and insurance provided by a federal-level
budget, as well as the design of an automatic insurance mechanism in order to face
country-specific shocks. However, there is not a full agreement on these issues since the
scope of the proposals is an empirical question. In this paper we will try to clarify these
questions. First, we will review the available empirical evidence on the stabilisation
provided by federal systems (section 2). Second, we will discuss the main points
regarding the implementation of an automatic mechanism against country-specific
shocks in a monetary union (section 3). And third, we will offer a specific proposal of
an insurance mechanism for a monetary union (section 4). Some concluding remarks are
presented in section 5.
32. Stabilisation in federal fiscal systems
The proposal of establishing an insurance mechanism has some tradition in the
classical literature on optimum currency areas (Kenen, 1969). More recently, in Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs (1992) we can find the first empirical study on this issue.  They start
from the assumption that the US federal budget automatically absorbs the effects of
shocks. The contribution of the fiscal system to stabilisation is computed from the
elasticities of  per capita federal governmentÕs tax revenues and transfers, with respect
to per capita disposable income, net of taxes and transfers. The authors use data for the
nine census regions of the US, during the period 1970-1988.
From estimated elasticities of - 0.327 and 1.275 for transfers and taxes,
respectively, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) evaluate the percentage of absorption of
the shock through the federal budget at 0.387. In other words, federal transfers and
taxes, taken together, would absorb around 40 per cent of the shock. The authors
conclude that the US budget provides automatic stabilisation mainly through the tax
system, given that the tax-income elasticity is greater, in absolute value, than the
transfer-income elasticity. And, by extending their results to Europe, they infer that it
would be difficult to find a similar degree of stabilisation because the European fiscal
system is not harmonised enough and the size of its budget is relatively small.
In a subsequent contribution, von Hagen (1992) starts from the same kind of
assumption than Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, but argues that their results are ambiguous.
The reason is that, by estimating their equation in levels, redistributive and stabilising
effects overlap. In addition, since their method does not allow them to capture changes
in the variables along time, the possibility of distinguishing between the effects of
transitory and country-specific shocks, on the one hand, and permanent and common
shocks, on the other, is not clear. In order to clarify these issues, von HagenÕs analysis is
performed with the variables transformed into first differences.
In this way, the role of the fiscal system in stabilisation is computed from the
elasticities of the changes in tax revenues and transfers (excluding social security due to
its redistributive effects), with respect to changes in the gross state product (a wider
measure of economic activity). The data are for the 51 states of the US, during the
period 1981-1986.  The estimated elasticities are - 0.17 and 0.985 for transfers and
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federal budget of 0.0984, that is, around 10 per cent. The strong discrepancy between
the degree of insurance provided by the federal budget found in both studies (40 per
cent for Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and 10 per cent for von Hagen) is not only related to
the different specification of the estimated equations, but also to the definition of the
variables and the different sample period.
Goodhart and Smith (1993) reply previous studies, trying to find the source of
the difference in results between them. They argue that the degree of fiscal
compensation depends on the nature of the shock, so that, if these effects are equally
distributed across regions the redistributive role of fiscal policy will be needed; but
when the effects are not uniformly distributed, which is required is an insurance
mechanism.
In order to find the degree of coverage provided by the federal budget, variables
are measured both in levels and in first differences. As in von Hagen (1992), the data for
the US are for the period 1981-1986, but they exclude the major oil-producer states. The
analysis is also applied to Canada and the UK.
From the equations estimated in levels, the results show a degree of shock
absorption of 13 per cent in the US, between 11 and 15 per cent in Canada, and 21 per
cent in the UK; and, when estimating in first differences the results are 11 per cent for
the US, between 12 and 17 per cent for Canada, and 21 per cent for the UK. Hence, the
figures show no strong differences between the two methods, and redistributive effects
are close to stabilisation effects. Goodhart and Smith conclude that the discrepancies
between previous studies may be due to the definition of the variables, problems of
endogeneity, and the different sample period.
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) use variables in levels and first differences, as well
as cross-section and time-series data, in order to distinguish between redistribution and
stabilisation, respectively. In the case of redistribution, the impact of fiscal variables
(taxes, social security, transfers and grants) is measured in response to long-term
income differentials across regions. On the other hand, when analysing stabilisation, the
impact of fiscal variables is measured in response to short-term deviations of the
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insurance function of fiscal policy is not explicitly identified. In any case, since fiscal
variables are added in a sequence, the difference between the coefficient estimates
measures the effect of including that variable. The data are for 48 states of the US
between 1969 and 1986, and for10 Canadian provinces between 1965 and 1988.
The authors find a redistribution effect of 22 per cent for the US, and 39 per cent
for Canada, and a degree of stabilisation of 30 per cent for the US and 17 per cent for
Canada, with the greater role in stabilisation given by transfers. Bayoumi and MassonÕs
results, then, suggest that both the studies of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and von Hagen,
overestimate the stabilising effect of the tax system. The reason is related to the
variables used in the empirical analysis, since per capita regional tax payments, relative
to national per capita tax payments, change with the cycle, but the same is not true for
transfers. On the contrary, Bayoumi and Masson take the ratio of regional and national
incomes alternatively adjusted for taxes, and for taxes plus transfers. Assuming that
taxes are proportional to income, and that transfers are independent of the level of
activity, these definitions allow them to show how transfers smooth the economic cycle.
Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and Lescure (1993) do not perform a regression analysis
for evaluating the stabilisation properties of federal budgets. Using a two-sector
simulation model, they try to measure the scope of the automatic stabilisation
(insurance) provided by the fiscal system, following the occurrence of a shock. The
model represents a region within a federal monetary union, and is calibrated paying
special attention to the major tax and expenditure categories. They stress the role of
social security payments (neglected by von Hagen) and the unemployment benefit at the
federal level, which does not exist in the US economy.
In their results, Pisani-Ferry et al. find that the degree of stabilisation provided
by the US federal budget would have been lower than in several European countries
such as Germany and France, due to the fact that in the US there is no unemployment
benefit at the federal level. The authors obtain an effect of 17 per cent for the US, 37 per
cent for France, and between 34 and 42 per cent for Germany, depending on whether
transfers among regions are included or not. They also found that stabilisation is mainly
provided by budget items not transferable to the EU budget in the medium run
6(unemployment benefit, social security, and interregional grants). From here, they
conclude that EMU would be viable keeping relatively independent fiscal policies,
without being necessary either any budget reform or creating automatic mechanisms to
implement the insurance function.
Finally, Goodhart and Smith (1993) also perform a simulation analysis, as an
alternative to the regression method. They study the effects of the tax system using the
Tax and Benefit Model built in the Institute for Fiscal Studies (i. e., a representation of
the United Kingdom tax and social security regulations applied to a representative
sample of households), obtaining an effect of 34 per cent for the case of UK, due to the
effect of taxes. From here, and taking into account the difficulties to recognise any
short-run fluctuations, they conclude that an adequate fiscal policy coordination would
be enough in order to insurance the different economies against the occurrence of
shocks. The reason is that policy interventions do not always deal with shocks at a
proper time, so policy measures might become counterproductive.
Summary
We have just reviewed how several empirical studies have tried to quantify the
degree of insurance provided by the central budget. These studies use two alternative
methods in order to quantify the contribution of fiscal variables to smooth the business
cycle: regression analysis and simulation analysis. As can be seen in Table 1, the results
show sensible discrepancies due to the variables chosen, the sample period and the
different methods of analysis.
7TABLE 1
Stabilisation in federal fiscal systems
STUDIES METHODS SOURCE OF
STABILISATION
RESULTS
REGRESSION
Sala-i-Martin and
Sachs (1992)
Variables in levels Taxes 40%  (US)
von Hagen (1992) Variables in 1st
differences
Taxes (excludes
social security)
10%  (US)
Goodhart and Smith
(1993)
Variables in 1st
differences
Taxes 11%  (US)
12-17%  (Canada)
21%  (UK)
Bayoumi and
Masson (1995)
Variables in 1st
differences
Transfers 30%  (US)
17%  (Canada)
SIMULATION
Pisani-Ferry et al.
(1993)
Two-sector model Transfers, social
security,
unemployment
benefit
17%  (US)
37%  (France)
34-42%  (Germany)
Goodhart and Smith
(1993)
IFS Tax and Benefit
Model
Taxes 34%  (UK)
83. Insurance mechanisms in monetary unions
We have seen in the previous section that there are no clear empirical results
regarding the degree of stabilisation provided by the central budget in the federal fiscal
systems already existing. As a consequence, no consensus has emerged on the degree of
fiscal federalism actually needed in monetary unions. It is true that, in principle, a
system of tax and transfers could absorb the effects of a shock. However, from an
empirical point of view, the coverage provided by the federal budget might be achieved
by different budget items, and the exact amount of the coverage is still an open
question.
Regarding the case of EMU, the size of the EU budget is too small to play the
same role than the US budget. And, since embodying the insurance function of fiscal
policy into the EU budget is not possible in the medium run, several studies have
proposed the design of a mechanism able to cope with country-specific shocks. Next,
we will discuss the different proposals available.
Majocchi and Rey (1993) start from the idea that stabilisation policy should be
carried out at the federal level, and that, if implemented at the European level, this
would require an increase in the size of the budget, with a subsequent fiscal reform. The
fiscal system should include new revenue sources, and since these reforms are not
feasible in the short run, they propose as insurance mechanism a Òcontingency fundÓ to
deal with country-specific shocks, which should operate in a discretional way to avoid
moral hazard problems. The authors also suggest that the mechanism should be financed
by the member countries in an ad hoc way. The amounts to be paid would be
conditioned in order to assure its consistency with the CommunityÕs objective, and the
fund could be used only if the shock did not originate from a policy failure.
Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) agree with Majocchi and Rey in the need of an
insurance mechanism at the federal level. They present two variants: a full stabilisation
mechanism, to offset any kind of country-specific shocks, and a limited stabilisation
mechanism, to offset only severe country-specific shocks. The latter is explicitly
designed to perform the insurance function of fiscal policy, and could be activated either
automatically or in a discretional way, depending on whether governments are required
to justify that the origin of the shock was beyond their control or not. These
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and avoid moral hazard. However, the authors conclude that the degree of insurance
provided would depend on the indicator of the shock, and on the size of the payment
received. Italianer and Vanheukelen propose as indicator the change in the
unemployment rate, but the financing of the mechanism remains an open question.
On the other hand, Mlitz and Vori (1993) analyse the possibility of designing
an insurance mechanism that would avoid redistribution, concluding that, if feasible, the
benefits from it would be too small. They start from the assumption that any kind of
insurance system based on unemployment compensation would imply redistribution in
the long run, which leads the authors to analyse a mechanism based on income
insurance. Next, they examine how insurance could offset different kinds of shocks, and
find little evidence on the incidence of common shocks with country-specific effects in
Europe. From here, they conclude that the EU would be close to an optimum currency
area not requiring a centralised insurance mechanism. Also, according to Mlitz and
Vori the insurance function should be instrumented at the national level, since this
should be designed to overcome the loss of national independence in the use of
macroeconomic policy associated with EMU.
Finally, von Hagen and Hammond (1998) investigate how an insurance
mechanism against country-specific shocks would work in a monetary union. The
desirable properties of such a mechanism should be simplicity, automaticity, not leading
to long-run redistribution, avoiding moral hazard, non-regressivity, budget neutrality,
and economic significance. The authors argue that such characteristics cannot be
achieved simultaneously, so they study a series of redistributive or stabilising
mechanisms according to different properties included in their design. Their results
show, firstly, that the higher the econometric complexity, the higher the degree of
stabilisation provided; simpler mechanisms would imply redistribution, unless a high
degree of economic integration would have been previously achieved. Secondly, they
found that the potential benefit of an insurance scheme is an empirical question that
remains in doubt, concluding hence that an automatic mechanism would not be
necessary.
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Summary
Table 2 summarises the proposals discussed above, on the need of an insurance
mechanism in a monetary union. These proposals balance the degree of automaticity
required, the proper level of government to implement the mechanism, the equilibrium
between redistribution and stabilisation, and the origin and destination of the funds. But
since the degree of coverage is an empirical question that depends on the characteristics
of the mechanism, there is no unambiguous conclusion on the need of such a policy
instrument.
TABLE 2
Desirability of an insurance mechanism in a monetary union
I. An automatic insurance mechanism would be useful
a) At the federal level
           a.1) Discretional                                                                       Majocchi and Rey (1993)
           a.2) Automatic                                                             Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993)
b) At the national level                                                                         Mlitz and Vori (1993)
II. An automatic mechanism would not be necessary        von Hagen and Hammond (1998)
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4. An insurance mechanism against country-specific shocks in EMU
In this section we will propose a simple insurance mechanism, specifically
designed to compensate to those countries experiencing country-specific shocks in a
monetary union. A more detailed exposition can be found in Bajo-Rubio and Daz-
Roldn (2000), where an empirical application to the 11 countries participating in EMU
is also provided.
The proposed mechanism uses as indicator of the occurrence of a shock the
changes in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging to the union. The
condition for a country to receive any payment from the mechanism would be to
experience a positive change in its unemployment rate, provided that at least one of the
other countries would have registered a decrease in its unemployment rate during the
same period. Notice that the latter condition guarantees the asymmetry of the shock.
Since in our empirical example we used monthly data, changes in unemployment refer
to the same month of the previous year.
The mechanism would be financed from a fund built from contributions of the
unionÕs member countries as a percentage of their tax collections (in the empirical
application we used VAT collections). Since these are procyclical, the countries not
affected by the unfavourable shock would contribute proportionally more than those
affected. The fund would be distributed among the countries suffering the shock
according to the proportion in which every one of them would have been affected. In
this way, each country affected by the unfavourable shock would receive a higher
amount of the fund, the higher were the relative increase in its unemployment rate, and
the lower were the number of countries suffering the shock and hence receiving
compensation. In other words, the proposed mechanism Òstabilises moreÓ the more
country-specific is the shock, so that it exclusively performs the insurance function. In
addition, the fund should be fully distributed every period, in order to avoid any
redistribution in the long run.
Finally, the degree of coverage provided by the mechanism to any country
suffering the shock, could be measured by the ratio of the total payments received
throughout the year to the size of the shock. In its turn, the latter could be proxied by the
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difference between the GDP levels in absence of the shock, and in presence of the
shock, computed from an estimation of the OkunÕs law for the 11 countries participating
in EMU. The results of applying this procedure to the empirical example in Bajo-Rubio
and Daz-Roldn (2000) are shown in Table 3, for the countries satisfying the
requirements to benefit from the mechanism in the year of reference (1997), and for
several alternative percentages of the tax collections given up by each country (denoted
by a) . As can be seen, the degree of coverage obtained would not be very far from those
found in the literature surveyed in section 2. Notice that the higher degree of coverage
enjoyed by France (and, to a lower extent, Italy) would be related to the shorter (7
months) but relatively strong unfavourable shock she had experienced in the year of
reference; in other words, the coverage would be higher the more country-specific is the
shock.
TABLE 3: Annual coverage provided by the insurance mechanism
(in percentage of the size of the shock)
Germany France Italy Luxembourg Austria
a  = 1% 12.38 15.47 13.19 12.24 12.43
a  = 0.9% 11.14 13.92 11.87 11.02 11.19
a  = 0.75% 9.29 11.60 9.90   9.18   9.32
Source: Bajo-Rubio and Daz-Roldn (2000), Table 5.
To conclude, notice that the insurance mechanism proposed in Bajo-Rubio and
Daz-Roldn (2000) is specifically designed for the case of country-specific shocks, so
that the insurance function would be properly addressed, without confusion with either
the redistribution or stabilisation functions, unlike previous studies on the subject. On
the other hand, even though it is obvious that such a mechani sm could raise mor al hazar d
issues, intr oducing a tempor al lim it to the recept ion of funds can miti gat e it. In any case, 
si nce the degree of coverage provided by the insurance mechanism should be designed
to be relatively modest, rather than to fully offset the occurrence of a shock, this should
contribute in itself to minimise moral hazard problems. F inall y, it shoul d be not iced that, 
even though the usef ulness of the insur ance functi on has been widely recogni sed, som e
authors [such as, e. g. , Ml itz and Vor i (1993) ] have proposed that thi s should be
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perf orm ed at the nat ional st atesÕ level , r at her than to the EMU-wi de level . Thi s i s no doubt 
an open question, for which there is no cl ear answer . However, if we recal l that, once
EMU is under way, Òpoli ticians and comm ent at ors wi ll , rightl y or wrongl y, bl ame the
severit y of cyclical downt ur ns on monet ary unionÓ (Goodhar t, 1995, p. 470) , the
avai labili ty of an EMU- level based automat ic insur ance mechanism could hel p to sustain
poli tical support for E MU in temporaril y disadvant aged count ries.
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5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we first reviewed the available empirical studies aimed to quantify
the degree of insurance against shocks, provided by the central budget in the federal
systems already existing. The results of this literature are not very conclusive since
redistribution and stabilisation are frequently overlapped, and stabilisation is not
properly distinguished from the insurance function of fiscal policy. Next, we discussed
the main points raised in the literature regarding the implementation of an automatic
mechanism, designed to cope with country-specific shocks in a monetary union, and
finished by presenting a specific proposal of such a mechanism.
This mechanism would use as indicator of the occurrence of a shock the changes
in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging to the union, and would be
financed through a fund built from contributions of these countries as a percentage of
their tax receipts. The fund would be distributed among the countries affected by a
negative country-specific shock according to the proportion in which every one of them
would have been affected by the shock. Our proposal was illustrated by means of an
empirical application to the case of EMU, and provided a degree of coverage of the
shock in line with the figures previously found in the literature for the existing federal
fiscal systems.
To summ ari se, our pr oposal of mechanism woul d be a quit e sim ple devi ce, 
pr ovidi ng a signif icant coverage to those countries experiencing eventual unfavourable
country-specific shocks within a monetary union, which could be used as starting point
of a more elaborated policy instrument.
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